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Starting  with  Wicksell  and  until  the  heyday  of  Keynesian  economics,  inflation, 
unemployment and business cycles were thought and taught mainly as problems 
originating  from  "saving-investment  imbalances"  due  to  some  form  of 
malfunctioning of the capital market. Whereas modern studies of imperfect capital 
markets have greatly improved our understanding of capital market failures, their 
impact on macroeconomics has remained surprisingly limited. The macroeconomic 
consequences  of  saving-investment  imbalances  are  still  undeveloped  in  this 
literature  The  most  popular  macroeconomic  model  to  date  -  the  so-called  New 
Neoclassical Synthesis - dispenses with capital market imperfections altogether. 
The aim of this paper is fill this gap. Section 2 overviews the historical foundations 
and the current state of the macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets. Section 3 
presents  a  competitive,  flex-price  model  of  saving-investment  imbalances  where 
deviations of the market interest rate from the Wicksellian natural rate generate 
(disequilibrium) business cycles. In section 4, the model is extended in order to 
make the market interest rate endogenous. This extension also allows preliminary 
considerations to be made about monetary policy and the control of the interest 
rate over the business cycle. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
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THE MACROECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS. 






Starting  with  Wicksell  […]  until  Friedman  revived  the  Quantity  Theory,  the 
saving-investment approaches dominated the field in this [Twentieth] century. All 
Keynesians, of whatever description, belong to this branch. The Stockholm School 
and the Austrians also descend from the Wicksell Connection. (Leijonhufvud (1981, 
p.132)). 
Since  the  origins  of  macroeconomics  and  for  a  long time,  inflation, 
unemployment and business cycles had been thought and taught mainly as 
problems related to intertemporal disequilibrium originating from "saving-
investment imbalances" due to some form of malfunctioning of the capital 
market. This approach to macroeconomics progressively fell by the wayside 
with  completion  of  the  Neo-Walrasian  general-equilibrium  paradigm,  the 
rise of Monetarism, and finally the advent of the New Classical School with 
its method of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.   
At the same time, a robust and rigorous body of literature has grown 
devoted  to  explaining  why  capital  markets  may  indeed  fail  in  their 
allocation and coordination tasks. This literature is a prominent branch of 
the "Post-Walrasian" (Colander (1998)) movement that has been profoundly 
reshaping  the  discipline  since  the  end  of  the  1970s.  The  common  root 
between  the  modern  theory  of  imperfect  capital  markets  and  this  more 
general theoretical movement is the abandonment of certain key elements 
in  the  Walrasian  paradigm  and  the  progressive  definition  of  a  different 
framework  characterized  by  combinations  of    a)  market  power  and  price-
making  (no  auctioneer  markets),  b)  heterogeneous  agents  with  incomplete 
knowledge  and/or  information,  c)  incomplete  markets  (e.g.    Hahn  (ed., 
1989)).  
  It is worth noting that some of the outstanding contributors to the 
modern theory of imperfect capital markets were motivated by the idea of 
giving firmer foundations to the original views of Wicksell and Keynes. 
"For  more  than  a  decade  now,  I  and  several  of  my  coauthors  (...)  have  been 
exploring the thesis that it is imperfections in the capital market - imperfections 
that  themselves  can  be  explained  by  imperfect  information  -  which  account  for  
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many  of  the  peculiar  aspects  of  the  behaviour  of  the  economy  which 
macroeconomics attempts to explain" (Stiglitz, 1992, p.269). 
"[This] second strand of New Keynesian literature explores another path suggested 
by  Keynes:  that  increased  flexibility  of  prices  and  wages  might  exacerbate  the 
economy's downturn. This insight implies that wage and price rigidity are not the 
only  problem,  and  perhaps  not  even  the  central  problem"  (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 
1993b, p.25). 
  However, whereas the study of imperfect capital markets has had far-
reaching  ramifications  at  the  microeconomic  level  of analysis  of  markets, 
intermediaries and institutions, its impact on macroeconomics has remained 
surprisingly limited. As will be seen below, almost all the ingredients of a 
complete  macro-theoretic  menu  are  available,  and  yet  the  most  popular 
macroeconomic model put forward to date - the so-called "New Neoclassical 
Synthesis" (NNS) - dispenses with capital market imperfections altogether.  
The  NNS  has  been  delimited  within  the  triangle  given  by  intertemporal 
equilibrium, monopolistic competition and sticky prices (Blanchard and Galì 
(2005)).  In  spite  of  the  Neo-Wicksellian-Keynesian  reading  of  the  NNS 
popularized by Woodford's major book (2003), the first tip of the triangle 
clearly  excludes  any  connection  with  the  macroeconomic  framework  of 
Wicksell and Keynes (Boianovsky and Trautwein (2004), Mazzocchi et al. 
(2008)). Thus, a clear divide has also emerged between the NNS and the 
earlier New Keynesian programme put forward by Stiglitz and co-authors.  
  The  problem,  however,  is  not  only  of  interest  for  the  history  of 
thought.  If the association of the NNS paradigm with the age of  "Great 
Moderation" - the sustained growth and employment with low and stable 
inflation  that  blessed  most  of  the  industrialized  world  in  the  1990s    - 
induced the profession to believe that the right theoretical recipe had been 
found  (Blanchard  (2000)),  its  inability  to explain,  predict  and  control  the 
seeds  of  dramatic  instability  erupted  repeatedly  in  the  world's  best 
developed capital market with the new millennium suggests that the demise 
of capital market imperfections in the building of the dominant paradigm 
has turned out to be a hasty and unfortunate choice. Creeping "financial 
imbalances  that  build  up  disguised  by  a  benign  economic  environment" 
(Borio and Lowe (2002, p. 1); italics added) have been detected as a major 
empirical regularity behind a significant sample of financial crises.  
  If this is true, however, it is also fair to say that the current state of 
development  of  the  macroeconomics  of  imperfect  capital  markets,  too,  
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reveals some deficiencies. On the one hand, its microfoundations provide us 
with a rigorous taxonomy of the reasons why the market real interest rate 
may differ from the rate associated with intertemporal general equilibrium 
(IGE) of the economy (the Wicksellian "natural rate of interest") (e.g. Stiglitz 
(1982, 1992)). This malfunctioning may result either in a form of rationing  
(the capital market does not clear at the market rate) or in a form of trading 
at false price (the capital market clears but the market rate differs from the 
natural  rate).  In  either  case,  saving  and  investment  will  generally  differ 
from the amount that would be consistent with (IGE). On the other hand, 
with few exceptions, the macroeconomic consequences of saving-investment 
imbalances are still undeveloped in this literature. Ignoring intertemporal 
disequilibrium  constitutes  a  major  theoretical  weakness  because  it  is  a 
logical  implication  in  any  theory  based  on  the  distinction  between  the 
market interest rate and the natural rate (see also Leijonhufvud (1981), van 
der Ploeg (2005)). Filling this gap is the main purpose of the paper. 
  Section  2  overviews  the  current  state  of  the  macroeconomics  of 
imperfect  capital  markets.  The  section  begins  with  a  summary  of  the 
modern foundations of imperfect capital markets, and ends with the remark 
that these do not develop the implications of saving-investment imbalances 
that  are  inherent  in  capital  market  misallocations.  Section  3  outlines  an 
analysis  of  these  implications.  First,  preliminary  tools  are  introduced. 
Second, I present a general-equilibrium flex-price model directly comparable 
with the standard NNS model. Here, however, (exogenous) deviations of the 
market  interest  rate  from  the  Wicksellian  natural  rate  generate 
(disequilibrium)  business  cycles  with  Wicksell-Keynesian  features.  In 
section 4, the model is extended in order to make the market interest rate 
endogenous  following  insights  from  both  Wicksell  and  Keynes.  This 
extension also allows for preliminary considerations about monetary policy 
and  the  control  of  the  interest  rate  over  the  business  cycle.  Section  5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets. An 
overview 
 
2.1. Brief historical foundations. Wicksell and Keynes 
  This subsection simply sketches, with no claim to provide a detailed 
picture,  some  historical  antecedents  of  the  macroeconomics  of  imperfect  
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capital markets. As the opening quotation indicates, Wicksell is the right 
and natural starting point. 
  As  is  well  known,  the  role  of  what  came  to  be  known  as  "saving-
investment imbalances" in the business cycle was put forward by Wicksell 
in  his  interest-rate  theory  of  the  general  price  level  (GPL)  and  of  its 
"cumulative processes" (e.g. (1898a,b)). This was centred on the notion of the 
"natural rate of interest". It is worth quoting one of the key sentences once 
again 
At any moment in time in any income situation there is always a certain rate of 
interest, at which the exchange value of money and the general level of commodity 
prices have no tendency to change. This can be called the normal rate of interest; its 
level  is  determined  by  the  current  natural  rate  of  interest,  the  real  return  on 
capital  in  production,  and  must  rise  or  fall with  this.  If the  rate of  interest  on 
money deviates downwards, be it ever so little, from this normal level, prices will, 
as long as the deviation lasts, rise continuously;  if it deviates upwards, they will 
fall indefinitely in the same way (1898a, p.82). 
Therefore, 
In Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative process, the maladjustment of the interest 
rate - the discrepancy between the market and the natural rate - is the central 
idea. It is also the idea that motivates the analysis of changes in the price level (or 
in  nominal  income)  in terms  of saving  and  investment. […].  Use  of  the  saving-
investment approach to income fluctuations is predicated on the hypothesis that 
the interest rate mechanism fails to coordinate saving and investment decisions 
appropriately (Leijonhufvud (1981, p.132)).  
  The natural question raised by this view is how this maladjustment 
may  happen.  Interpretations  here  are  more  difficult,  but it  seems  fair  to 
point out two basic ideas. The first is the difference between a monetary 
economy and a barter or "corn economy". In the former, unlike the latter, 
capital is not self-lent in kind by households to themselves,  but firms need 
to  borrow  funds  in  monetary  form  from  households  in  order  to  pay  for 
capital goods (e.g. Wicksell (1898b, p.84)). Second, there are intermediaries 
between savers and investors. As long as non-bank agents borrow and lend 
among themselves, the total amount of nominal purchasing power in the 
economy is redistributed but cannot (need not) increase. The capital market 
finds its equilibrium at the natural rate of interest as determined by the 
"forces of productivity and thrift" that equate saving and investment at full-
employment of resources. Yet, as soon as the banking system (central bank 
and  private  banks)  comes  into  play,  the  latter  proposition  no  longer 
necessarily holds. A private bank is in a position to grant additional nominal  
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purchasing power to any of its depositors’ accounts with no one else in the 
economy undergoing an equivalent reduction. Likewise, a private bank can 
increase its own nominal purchasing (lending) power by borrowing from the 
central bank. Thus, the point is that the banking system as a whole might 
both  expand  the  total  nominal  purchasing  power  in  the  economy  and 
allocate  it  at  terms  that  differ  from  those  dictated  by  full-employment 
saving-investment equilibrium (e.g. Wicksell (1898b, p. 74, ff.)). 
  Note that, from the viewpoint of modern analysis, the kind of market 
failure that Wicksell introduces is not in the form of rationing, but in the 
form of "trade at false price" (more on this distinction in section 2.3 below). 
See Figure 1: if the market interest rate rt differs from the natural rate r*t 
and  saving  differs  from  investment,  the  capital  market  does  clear  at  all 
times, with households and firms saving and investing, respectively, what 
they wish, as the banking sector steps in to fill the gap by hoarding (excess 














  As  to  the  motivation  for  banks  to  extend  credit  beyond  (or  below) 
saving-investment equilibrium, a possible explanation may be, in modern 
terms, limited information. In various passages, Wicksell warned that the 
critical  challenge  for  monetary  and  banking  policy  lies  in  the  natural 
interest  rate  being  subject  to  unobservable  shocks  and  fluctuations  (e.g. 
1898a, 82 ff.). If banks do not observe the natural rate directly, and are not 
immediately constrained in their ability to extend and contract their loans, 
the market interest may well deviate from the natural rate as long as banks 
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a signal is, in Wicksell's view, precisely the cumulative process of changes in 
the GPL. 
  The  debate  on  the  business  cycle  in  the  first  two  decades  of  the 
Twentieth  century  was  largely  dominated  by  Wicksellian  ideas  as  re-
elaborated  by  the  Swedish,  Austrian  and  Cambridge  Schools  (e.g. 
Boianovsky and Trautwein (2004, 2006)). At that time it was understood 
that  saving-investment  imbalances  -  or  the  breakdown  of  Say's  Law  as 
Keynes put it - not only imply that today's supply of goods exceeds demand, 
but also have an intertemporal nature, in that tomorrow's consumption and 
production plans will not match. Hence these imbalances are a major force 
behind the determination of  the level of real and nominal variables as well 
as their (endogenous) fluctuations.   
  Keynes's first major theoretical work, the Treatise on Money (1930), 
was clearly developed along this line of reasoning, whilst the General Theory 
(1936) can be viewed as an attempt to recast the Wicksellian ideas in terms 
of real economic activity and employment. Ample textual evidence, in the 
General Theory (e.g. Bk. II) and after (Keynes (1937a, b, c)), testifies that 
Keynes  sought  to  explain  unemployment  equilibrium  as  a  result  of  a 
mismatch between investment and saving due to a capital market failure. 
Yet Keynes was even more sceptical than Wicksell about the very existence 
of  the  natural  rate  of  interest,  and  pointed  to  a  different  account  of  the 
capital  market  failure.  This  was  related not  to  intermediaries  but  to  the 
"monetary nature of the rate of interest". Uncertainty and the demand for 
money  as  store  of  value  and  as  a  speculative  asset  were  brought  to  the 
forefront as the main causes driving a wedge between the market interest 
rate and the rate that, in the same given circumstances, would yield the 
full-employment  saving-investment  equilibrium.  However,  like  Wicksell, 
Keynes  did  not  introduce  any  form  of  rationing:  the  capital  market 
eventually  clears  at  a  "false"  interest  rate  leading  to  the  unemployment 
equilibrium. 
   Throughout the first half of its parable, the "Keynesian revolution" 
was  understood,  explained  and  taught  precisely  as  a  departure  from  the 
neoclassical macroeconomics of general equilibrium theory on the grounds of  
capital markets. Keynes's discussion of the role of the labour market in the 
adjustment process in the event of excess saving, and in particular in light 
of  the  possibility  that  the  real  wage  may  not  fall  enough  (1936,  ch.  19), 
should be understood as a warning that there is no reason to expect that the  
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misallocational  effects  of  a  "wrong"  price  of  capital  will  necessarily  be 
corrected  through  changes  in  the  price  of  labour by  market  forces.  Wage 
stickiness,  though  possibly  a  fact  of  real  life,  is  a  side  issue  in  this 
theoretical picture. Indeed, the theoretical debate in the aftermath of the 
General  Theory  concentrated  on  the  theory  of  the  interest  rate  (see 
Moggridge,  ed.  1987,  pp.201-367)  with  little  or  no  reference  to  wage 
stickiness. 
 
2.2. Modern foundations of imperfect capital markets 
  The modern foundations of imperfect capital markets are rooted in 
the Post-Walrasian (Colander (1998)) research that, since the late 1970s, 
has  reformulated  the  first  principles  of  individual  behaviour  and  market 
organization. As recalled in the Introduction, an initial important impulse 
came  from  the  scholars  who  were  seeking  to  give  better  microeconomic 
foundations  to  Keynes's  idea  that  capital  market  failures  are  the  main 
source  of  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  However,  with  respect  to  Keynes's 
approach centred on outside uncertainty and the demand for money as store 
of value, which was subsequently embodied in the Neoclassical Synthesis, 
the  modern  foundations  marked  a  significant  shift  towards  inside 
uncertainty,  that  is  asymmetric  information  (AI)  and  the  related  agency 
problems  between  lenders  and  borrowers.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
general outlook is more Wicksellian than Keynesian. It is also worth adding 
that Keynes, and many of his followers, attached great importance to his 
notion  of  non-classic-probabilistic  uncertainty  underlying  savers'  and 
investors' behaviour (e.g. (1937c)) as the source of the endemic nature of the 
capital  market  failures.  The  new  foundations  are  instead  laid  within  the 
boundaries  of  classical  probabilistic  uncertainty  and  rational  decision-
making.  They    essentially  rest  on  the  following  five    points  (e.g.  Stiglitz 
(1982)). 
  1) Agents heterogeneity: markets exist and trades take place because 
agents  differ.  Traditional  microeconomics  concentrates  on  differences  in 
preferences and/or endowments as inducements to trade; the economics of 
imperfect  capital  markets  concentrates  on  differences  in  information 
endowments. 
  2)  Imperfect  information:  agents  have  free  access  to  a  public 
information set on relevant current and future state variables, which may be 
incomplete for the future variables (probabilistic risk); but they do not have  
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free  access  to  each  other's  private  information  set  on  individual  payoff-
relevant variables or actions (asymmetric information, AI). 
  3) Incomplete markets:  agents are constrained not to trade for goods 
to  which  they  attach  positive  value.  In  particular,  economies  are  studied 
where future contingent markets for consumption goods are absent. Note 
that  the  definition  of  asymmetric  information  implies  another  missing 
market, the market for private information. 
  4) Sequential time and transactions: markets operate and trades take 
place  in  discrete  "calendar"  time  periods.  In  each  period,  only  spot 
transactions take place. 
  5) The "special nature" of financial "goods": capital markets handle 
"special goods", namely financial contracts. They are special for a number of 
reasons:  a)  they  are  immaterial  entitlements  to  future  delivery  of  money  
payments, b) the transaction involved is opened spot (the purchase of the 
entitlement), but is closed in the future (the delivery of the money payment), 
c) the open end of the transaction is dependent upon both general market 
states and  specific individual states or actions of the party due to deliver 
the money payment. 
  It is the combination of the first four points with the fifth that places 
capital markets outside the Walrasian paradigm. Given that in the case of 
financial resources the demander-supplier relationship extends over time, 
both are in a peculiar position with respect to normal demander-supplier 
spot relationships in good markets.  The demander will seek to optimize the 
use of the financial resources under the constraint of the financial contract 
with the supplier. The supplier will seek to optimize the allocation of his/her 
available  financial  resources  among  different  demanders  (financial 
contracts) in relation to  the characteristics of each. Therefore, the supplier 
should  engage  in  three  informational  activities  as  the  contractual 
relationship with the demander unfolds over time:  
·  screening (before entering the contractual relationship) to ascertain the 
distribution of the characteristics of the demanders  
·  monitoring (during a specific contractual relationship) to ascertain that 
the  use  of  resources  made  by  the  demander  is  consistent  with  the 
contractual commitment 
·  auditing (at the end of a specific relationship) to ascertain the final value 
of the resources employed.  
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  Imperfect  information  is  not  removed  when  any  of  the  above 
mentioned  informational  activities  is  lacking.  The  following  table 
summarizes the relevant taxonomy. 
 
Table 1 
  Type of asymmetry  Consequence 
Screening  Ex ante  Adverse selection: 
probability of transacting 
with low quality subjects 
Monitoring 
Auditing 
Ex post  Moral hazard: opportunity 
for non observable actions 
by the counterparty 
 
   In turn each of these activities may have an opportunity cost to the 
supplier,  and/or  some  of  the  bits  of  information  involved  may  not  be 
attainable at all. In the first case, when paying the cost is sufficient for the 
supplier to obtain all the relevant information, the market operates with 
transaction  costs.  In  the  second  case,  when  some  information  remains 
hidden to the supplier, the market operates under asymmetric information 
as defined previously. 
  Analyses  of  financial  relationships  under  costly  or  asymmetric 
information  produce  results  that  as  a  rule  imply  some  form  of  capital 
market  failure.  These  results  are  often  referred  to  as  violations  of  the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller (1958)) that demonstrates 
the irrelevance of financial factors in firms' real investment choices. Market 
failures  emerge  as  a  consequence  of  two  possible  responses  of  rational 
agents to imperfect information: one, in a context of pre-defined contracts, 
ex-ante asymmetry and adverse selection, is the uninformed party's use of 
the  price  of  the  financial  transaction  as  an  indicator  of  the  hidden 
information about the other party (e.g. Stiglitz, 1987), the other, in a context 
of ex-post asymmetry and moral hazard, is the design of financial contracts 
able to regulate the conflict of interests between the better informed and the 
worse informed party once the relationship is established (e.g. Hart, 1995, 
Part II). 
  Looking at the macroeconomic level, the foregoing array of imperfect 
capital-market  transactions  have  mostly  been  employed  to  deploy  new 
building blocks regarding 
·  investment in fixed capital (as a component of aggregate demand: e.g. 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Bond and Jenkinson (1996))   
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·  investment  in  working  capital,  in  particular  the  wage  bill  (as  a 
component  of  aggregate  supply:  e.g.  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1988, 
1993a)) 
·  financial factors in the business cycle (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Bernanke  et  al.  (1996),  Gertler  (1988),  Gertler  and  Hubbard  (1988, 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) 
·  financial factors in growth  (e.g. Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001), Allen 
and Gale (2001)) 
·  policy,  especially  monetary  policy,  implications  (e.g.  Bernanke  and 
Blinder  (1998),  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1991),  Gertler  and  Gilchrist 
(1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) 
  Hence  it  seems  fair  to  say  that  almost  a  complete  macroeconomic 
theory  with  imperfect  capital  markets  is  now  available.  For  reasons  of 
space, here my assessment of the state of the art will be limited to the first 
and second points, with some indirect considerations of the last1. These, in 
my view, are also the key issues on which the strengths and weaknesses of 
the theory should be assessed.   
 
2.3. Under-investment and over-investment 
  Following  the  taxonomy  racalled  in  paragraph  2.1,  let  us  first 
consider the class of models with rationing. This allocational failure entails 
that  the  capital  market  does  not  clear,  that  is,  saving  is  not  equal  to 
investment at the market rate. A typical example is given by the Stiglitz-












                                            










   This  is  a  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the  credit  market  which, 
however, includes an endogenous supply of funds vis-à-vis a conventional 
downward-sloping  demand  curve.  The  supply  of  funds  comes  from 
households' deposits and can be regarded as representative of savings. In a 
perfect  market,  intermediation  (if  any)  would  be  neutral,  and  deposits 
(savings) would equal loans (investments) at the market-clearing interest 
rate.  As a consequence of adverse selection, however, the supply curve of 
loans  is  backward-bending.  This  is  because  increasing  the  interest  rate 
raises  the  unit  return  to  loans  on  the  one  hand,  but  also  raises  the 
probability of default by borrowers on the other. Beyond a certain threshold 
of the interest rate,  r t the banks' expected profit bends backward and so 
does the supply of loans. With this supply curve in place, it may happen that 
the demand for loans exceeds supply at the maximum interest rate set by 
banks, and excess demand is rationed. The conclusion is that, at the interest 
rate  set  by  banks,  notional  investment  exceeds  saving  whereas  actual 
investment is constrained to be equal to saving. 
  Alternatively,  we  may  consider  models  with  trading  at  false  price, 
which is emphatically not to be confused with rationing. In this case the 
capital market clears, but the market interest rate differs from the natural 
rate.  A  useful  example  is  provided  by  De  Meza  and  Webb  (1987).  Like 
Stiglitz and Weiss they consider a credit market characterized by AI and 
adverse selection. This phenomenon, however, operates in the opposite way 
from that envisaged by Stiglitz and Weiss. There, increasing the interest 
rate  crowds  out  low-risk  projects,  here  it  crowds  in  high-return  projects. 
Thus  the  average  quality  of  borrowers  is  higher  than  the  quality  of  the 
marginal borrower. As a result, the banks' expected profit function, as well 
as  the  loan  supply  curve,  are  monotonically  increasing  with  the  interest 
rate, and a market-clearing equilibrium can be reached. However, De Meza 
and  Webb  demonstrate  that  the  net  present  value  of  the  project  of  the 
marginal  borrower  is  negative.  Their  conclusion  is that  adverse  selection 
may well generate excess investment by way of the bank sector. In other 
words, if the natural interest rate is the rate that drives the net present  
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value of the marginal borrower to zero, we can also say that the equilibrium 
interest rate charged by banks is below the natural rate2. 
 
2.4. Macroeconomic implications 
The first, in order of time and importance, macroeconomic projection 
of  the  study  of  imperfect  capital  markets  concerns  aggregate  investment 
determination,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  under-investment,  that  is, 
investment below the perfect-market benchmark (e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988)).  
Figure 3 depicts the main issues. The vertical axis measures the return to 
invested capital (however it is measured), and the horizontal axis measures 
total investment. A standard inverse relationship is considered. The first 
key point (the first violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem) is that in AI 
capital  markets  firms  face  different  costs  of  capital  according  to  different 
sources even in the absence of exogenous risk. Typically, the cheapest cost of 
capital rt is the risk-free opportunity cost of internal funds (in a risk-free 
market this would also be the single market rate).  External funds, whether 
they be equity or debt (here we need not distinguish them), entail an extra 
cost r't due to the AI "lemon" premium that the market charges to cope with 
















                                            
2Thus this model can be viewed as a modern explanation of the role of banks in 














In some circumstances, namely under rationing, the lemon premium 
becomes "infinite" (the second violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem), 
and the corresponding investments cannot be financed at the given market 
conditions. This phenomenon may occur in the equity market (e.g. Leland-
Pyle (1977), Myers-Majluf (1984)) as well as in the credit market (e.g. Jaffee 
and Stiglitz (1990), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). 
Consequently, total investment comes to depend on a) the extent to 
which  firms  own  internal  funds,  b)  the  extent  to  which,  and  the  cost  at 
which, they have access to external funds. Therefore, two main phenomena 
characterize AI capital markets 
·  financial hierarchy (or pecking order): firms finance investment starting 
from  the  cheapest  source  of  capital  supply,  and  they  resort  to  other 
sources  only  as  the  scale  of,    and  the  return  to,  investment  increase 
sufficiently  
·  financial rationing: some classes of firms may have no access at all to 
some forms of capital supply; hence their ability to invest is constrained 
by their amount of internal resources, say I1. 
  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  two  phenomena  give  rise  to  two 
different  allocational  situations.  The  former,  generally,  entails  that  total 
investment  may  be  less  than  it  would  be  in  a  perfect  market,  but 
nonetheless  firms  are  unconstrained  (i.e.  they  are  on  their  efficient 
investment curve that they reach by combining different funds). The latter, 
by  contrast,  implies  both  a  loss  of  total  investment  and  that  firms  are 
constrained  (i.e.  they  are  off  their  efficient  investment  curve).  In  other 
words, in one case we have low but efficient investment at the margin, in 
the other we have a loss of efficient investments.  
  It is perhaps a clue to the Keynesian inspiration of this literature that 
its has largely focused on under-investment, the cases of rationing being the 
most  critical  ones.  On  the  other  hand,  if  stagnations  and  recessions  are 
recurrent  evils  that  may  be  traced  back  to  under-investment,  it  is 
nonetheless striking that the most important episodes of large-scale under-
investment, starting from 1929 and ending in 2008, did follow episodes of 
over-investment,  with  stock  market  bubbles  and  the  subsequent  crash 
landing  of  stock  values  (Borio  and  Lowe  (2002)).  The  most  important 
Keynesian author who sought to explore capital market failures leading to 
over-investment and complete boom-bust cycles was Minsky (1972, 1975). 
He  should  be  credited  with  the  introduction  of  the  concepts  of  "financial  
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fragility" and "financial accelerator" that have subsequently been reshaped 
with the modern tools of the New Keynesians (Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 
1990),  Bernanke  et  al.  (1996)).  De  Meza  and  Webb  (1987)  have  drawn 
attention to the fact that AI may lead to over-investment, and Tamborini 
(2001, ch. 8) has exemplified this case in a simple model of equity market à 
la Myers-Majluf. The compelling evidence for the role of over-investment in 
the  generation  of  recent  financial  crises  has  prompted  further  research 
extending towards the role of monetary policy (e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000), 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Bordo and Jeanne (2002)). 
 
2.5. Implications for monetary policy 
  A  few  considerations  regarding  monetary  policy  are  in  order  since 
research on capital market failures has produced some tangible effects. The 
1990s witnessed the resurgence of the view that "monetary policy matters", 
in  the  sense  that  policy  interventions  (mainly  activated  by  changes  in 
administered rates and money-market rates) are typically followed by quick 
and large responses in short-term interest rates, monetary aggregates, total 
credit, different measures of real economic activity, and by slow and delayed 
adjustment of different price indexes. More controversial is the search for 
explanations of  the impact of monetary policy on economic activity. 
   Historically, research has mostly concentrated on aggregate demand 
as the key connection between monetary policy and economic activity, and 
consequently on various possible transmission mechanisms from monetary 
policy  instruments  to  the  components  of  aggregate  demand.  The  first  of 
these, in order of time and importance, is the open-market channel whereby 
open-market  operations  (exogenous  money),  embedded  in  perfect  capital 
markets,  affect  private  expenditure  directly  (via  real  balance  effect)  or 
indirectly (via interest rates). Consideration of capital market imperfections 
has reshaped this view, reviving the so-called credit channel3.  
  This  channel  helps  explain  the  large  impact  that  monetary 
interventions are observed to exert on private expenditure by way of capital 
market  imperfections,  notably  asymmetric  information  generating  agency 
problems between the firm and its external financial suppliers. According to 
                                            
3In truth, this is a rather heterogeneous collection of views, dating far back in time 
and sharing the idea that changes in banks' assets (i.e. total credit to the economy), 
rather than in banks' liabilities (i.e. money balances in the economy), are the key 
mechanisms linking economic activity to monetary policy (Trautwein (2000)).   
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a large body of evidence, bank credit is the first, or exclusive, choice among 
external  sources,  most  likely  for  small  firms  with  poor  internal 
accumulation and with limited access to open markets. The credit channel 
may  be  activated  by  the  central  bank's  control  of  the  monetary  base 
(changes in bank reserves) as well as by interest-rate management (changes 
in  interbank  rates).    What  is  relevant  to  this  approach  is  that  monetary 
policy  affects  bank  lending  rates  and  the  supply  of  credit  (endogenous 
money).  When  embedded  in  imperfect  financial  markets,  a  monetary 
restriction that lowers asset prices, diverts bank funds from loans to bonds, 
and  raises  bank  interest  rates,  worsens  almost  all  possible  sources  of 
investments (reference papers are Blinder (1987), Bernanke-Blinder (1988), 
Greenwald-Stiglitz (1990, sec.1.3), Stiglitz-Weiss (1992)). In any case, the 
key theoretical ingredients that may account for the real effects of monetary 
policy remain located in good and labour market imperfections leading to 
"nominal rigidities" or "sticky prices" as a sine qua non condition for real 
effects to develop. 
Another  research  path  follows  the  theoretical  argument  that 
restricting  the  link  between  monetary  policy  and  economic  activity  to 
aggregate-demand  effects  is  an  over-simplification  of  microeconomic 
relationships. There are, in fact, several possible links with aggregate supply 
as well. First, investment decisions determine future production capacity; if 
imperfect financial markets in some way transmit monetary policy impulses 
through constrained investment decisions, the effects should also manifest 
themselves in current production decisions which must be consistent with 
the overall intertemporal production path of each firm (e.g. Stiglitz (1992)). 
Second,  besides  fixed  capital,  also  working  capital  may  need  financial 
resources, as current inputs should be paid before output can be sold, and 
these  resources  (liquidity,  inventories,  credit,  etc.)  carry  a  financial  cost. 
Consequently, the interest rate paid on working capital affects production 
costs - a view largely shared by businessmen (e.g. Goodhart (1986)) - whilst 
monetary policy, by altering interest rates, can influence aggregate supply 
through this cost channel. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993a), Christiano 
et al. (1997, 2005) paved the way; Barth and Ramey (2001), Ravenna and 
Walsh (2003, 2006), Chowdhury et al. (2006) testify to the growing interest 
in  this  further  channel  of  monetary  policy  and  provide  evidence  of  its 
importance for monetary transmission.  
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The  supply-side  effects  of  monetary  policy  have  several  interesting 
implications. First, they call into question the general presumption that real 
effects of monetary shocks can only arise as a consequence of sticky prices. 
As stressed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993b) co-movements of demand and 
supply after a monetary shock can provide a straightforward explanation for 
the observed pattern of large adjustments in quantities and small ones in 
prices even in competitive markets with flexible prices. On the other hand, 
such  co-movements  of  demand  and  supply  in  a  general-equilibrium 
framework offer the appropriate key to establishing whether or not the so-
called "price puzzle" (Sims (1992)) - the inflationary effect of a monetary 
restriction  -  occurs.  According  to  Christiano  et  al.  (1997),  this  approach 
outperforms the traditional sticky price hypothesis on the grounds of the 
"stylized facts" of the monetary business cycle. 
  Second,  the  traditional  demand-side  effects,  which  require  sticky 
prices as a sine qua non condition for real effects,  generally imply that real 
wages  and  profits  are  anti-cyclical  with  output  after  a  monetary  shock, 
whereas it is an empirical regularity that they are pro-cyclical. This fact can 
be  explained  by  bringing  supply-side  effects  into  the  picture.  If,  say,  a 
monetary restriction raises firms' variable costs and/or forces them to cut 
production, then, for a given monetary wage, prices may well increase and 
real  wages  fall  (Blinder  (1987),  Barth  and  Ramey  (2001)).  Alternatively, 
firms may respond by cutting back labour demand, thus forcing real wages 
to  fall  directly  (Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1988,  1993a),  Christiano  et  al. 
(1997)). 
  Finally,  it  is  typical  of  the  models  cited  above  that,  one  way  or 
another, the equilibrium level of output (employment) comes to depend on 
the policy interest rate as an element of firms' real unit cost along with the 
wage rate (and possibly other input prices). Hence, it can no longer be taken 
for granted that monetary policy interventions are bound to generate mere 
transitory effects around, with no permanent impact on, potential output, 
the natural rate of unemployment, etc.  (Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a)).  
  
2.6. Whither saving-investment imbalances? 
  More  than  two  decades  of  active  research  in  the  field  of  imperfect 
capital  markets  have  greatly  improved  our  understanding  of  the  actual 
working of these markets, and of their role in the life of market economies, 
either for the better of stability and growth or for the worse of instability  
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and slumps. Nonetheless, the overall picture is still incomplete. The point is 
that in the presence of market imperfections, it is generally no longer the 
case that saving equals investment at the Wicksellian natural interest rate, 
that is, the interest rate which grants IGE (Stiglitz (1992)). Yet we generally 
do not find explicit treatment of the supply side of the capital market, or of 
the intertemporal consistency between saving and investment.  
  Looking  back  at  the  evolution  of  the  macroeconomics  of  imperfect 
capital markets, from its origins to its modern developments, we may be 
struck by a sort of paradox. Initially, the key issue was the macroeconomic 
consequences of saving-investment imbalances, in a theoretical context with 
relatively  poor  instruments  of  microeconomic  and  intertemporal  analysis. 
Today, we have a rich and powerful theory of capital market failures at the 
microeconomic  level,  but  their  macroeconomic  consequences  are  poorly 
developed. Exploring this neglected side of the modern macroeconomics of 
imperfect  capital  markets  is  the  purpose  of  the  subsequent  parts  of  the 
paper. 
 
3.  Some  macroeconomics  of  saving-investment  imbalances. 
The baseline  model 
 
3.1. Preliminary tools and discussion 
  To begin with, let us consider an economy along its IGE path. The 
corresponding price vector includes the relative price of factors at each time 
t  (the  real  wage  rate  and  the  real  interest  rate  as  dictated  by  real 
determinants).  The  problem  is  how  the  economy  reacts  when  the  real 
interest rate is "wrong". As usual, investment in t determines the capital 





Table  2.  Allocation  scheme  when  the  market  real  interest  rate  differs  from  the 
natural rate  
  t 
Rt < R*                  Rt  > R*                      
t+1 
Rt < R*                         Rt  > R* 
Capital market  St < It                               St > It  Kt+1 > Kt                           Kt+1 < Kt 
Goods market  ADt > Yt               ADt < Yt   AD t+1 < Yt+1        AD t+1 > Yt+1 
R = market real interest rate, R* = natural interest rate, S = saving, I = 
investment, K = capital stock, AD = aggregate demand, Y = aggregate 
supply (potential output) 
 
  Consider the case that in t the market real interest rate exceeds the 
natural one. Excess saving arises, to which there corresponds excess supply 
in  the  output  market  in  t,  and,  by  intertemporal  Walras  Law,  excess 
(planned) demand in t+1. Note that the capital-market disequilibrium in t, if 
uncorrected, must have an intertemporal disequilibrium effect on the output 
and labour markets in t+1 even though the real wage is perfectly "right" 
with  respect  to  the  natural  interest  rate.  As  thoroughly  explained  by 
Leijonhufvud  (1981),  these  are  the  two  key  logical  implications  of  any 
saving-investment imbalance theory, namely 
·  "unemployment will not converge to its natural level unless the interest 
rate goes to its natural level - (...) the latter condition will not always be 
fulfilled" (p. 135) 
·  "with  the  interest  rate  at  the  right  level,  market  forces  should  make 
unemployment converge to the natural rate - otherwise not" (p.136). 
As  a  corollary,  the  fact  that  we  may  observe  disequilibrium  in  one 
market, say the labour market, does not imply that the problem lies in  that 
market. In a system of interrelated markets, "wrong signals" impinging on 
one market may well originate from elsewhere.  
The very nature of the problem associated with information asymmetries suggests 
that  it  is  precisely  in  those  markets  which  are  in  charge  of  coordinating 
intertemporal decisions that rigidities and inefficiencies are most common [Since] 
investment  decisions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  signals  sent  by  these  typically 
inefficient markets, it is only too natural to expect that they lead to distortions. As 
a result, the burden of adjustment will fall upon other markets (Fitoussi (2001, 
p.24)) 
  In order to develop these implications analytically, we can take the 
two  alternative  analytical  routes  exemplified  in  section  2.3,  rationing  or  
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trading  at  false  price.  The  first  requires  exploring  different  rationing 
schemes (e.g. Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2005)) and non-market-clearing 
processes (e.g. Chiarella et al. (2005)). Rationing schemes typically produce 
adjustments in quantities at the given rationing prices. A typical example is 
given by the "short-side-of-the-market" rule. If  Rt > R*, the rule states that 
households are rationed in saving in t and are rationed in consumption in 
t+1,  whereas  firms  are  only  rationed  in  production  in  t.  That  is  to  say, 
households are forced to save in t, and consume in t +1, as much as it is 
determined  by  firms'  investment  in  t,  and  production  capacity  in  t+1, 
respectively. Likewise, in t firms can undertake as much investment as they 
wish, but they are forced to  produce less.  
  With trading at false price, demand equals supply at all times, but 
the resulting vector of prices and quantities is different than in the IGE 
vector. Hence, there must be an allocational "error" arising at some point in 
the system. In general, we may expect a mix of adjustment in prices and 
quantities. Yet the mix has little to do with the degree of price flexibility. 
Rather, the eventual result depends first of all on the allocation scheme in 
the capital market. 
  Whereas the bulk of the modern literature on capital market failures 
deals with rationing, here I shall pursue the other route, which was instead 
common to both Wicksell and Keynes. Here I shall follow Tamborini (2007) 
based  on  Wicksell's  hypothesis  that  the  banking  system  sets  the  market 
interest  rate  and  then  it  fills  any  possible  gap  between  investment  and 
saving if the market rate differs from the natural rate by lending or hoarding 
reserves (see section 2.1 and Figure 1 above)4. If firms are on the long side 
of the market, Rt < R*, they can actually invest more than households wish 
to save thanks to banks' additional loans. If households are on the long side, 
they are allowed to save as much as they wish by banks hoarding reserves. 
For  the  time  being,  the  interest  rate  set  by  the  banking  system  is  kept 
exogenous, whereas it will be endogenized later on. On these assumptions, it 
can  be  shown  that  in  a  competitive,  flex-price  economy  with  optimizing, 
forward-looking  agents,  saving-investment  imbalances  with  trades  at  the 
"false"  interest  rate  in  t  imply  a  single,  well-defined  vector  of  output 
realizations  to  be  accommodated  by  the  goods  market  in  t  and  t+1.  The 
related market-clearing paths of output and the GPL depend on technology, 
                                            
4Recall the model by De Meza and Webb mentioned in section 2.3.  
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production capacity and price expectations. Yet the key point is that both 
deviate  from  the  IGE  path  that  would  obtain  with  trade  at  the  natural 
interest rate. Under suitable, though standard, conditions on the utility and 
production functions, both output and the GPL deviate upwards if Rt < R* 
and deviate downwards if Rt > R*. 
 
3.2. The model 
  This  subsection  introduces  a  log-linear  version  of  the  above-
mentioned model that focuses on unemployment upon the assumption that a 
unique, well-defined relationship (e.g. Okun Law) exists between output and 
unemployment.  
  Let us consider an economy with IGE characterized by the natural 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU) u as determined by a given combination of 
tastes,  technology  and  the  relative  value  of  the  real  wage  rate  w  with 
respect to the natural interest rate r. All the IGE variables (u, w, r) are 
assumed to be constant5. As discussed above, the actual unemployment rate 
at any time, ut, differs from u to the extent that the market real interest 
rate,  it  -  pe
t+1,  differs  from  r.  Also  recall  that  any  saving-investment 
imbalance  at  time  t  implies  a  corresponding  labour  demand-supply 
imbalance at time t+1. Hence there should be a feed-forward effect of current 
interest-gaps on present and future unemployment gaps. Therefore, looking 
at  the  time  series  of  the  two  variables  one  may  expect  to  detect  1) 
dependence  of  unemployment  gaps  on  past  interest-rate  gaps,  2)  some 
degree of (spurious) persistence of unemployment gaps due to dependence 
on the common interest-rate gap6. Consequently, the unemployment out-of-
equilibrium  dynamics  can  also  be  represented  by  a  first-order  linear 
equation like the following  
                                            
5According to standard DSGE methodology these variables may change over time 
owing to random shocks to the underlying parameters. This feature is inessential 
for present purposes. 
6As a matter of fact, recurrent estimates of the output/unemployment and inflation 
functions invariably find these features. See Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2006) 
and Caresma et al. (2005) for a survey. These empirical regularities are not easily 
accommodated  within  a  model  whose  hallmark  is  the  role  of  so-called  forward-
looking output and inflation functions, unless the model is filled with additional ad 
hoc "frictions" (Chiarella et al. (2005, chs. 1 and 8) offer a thorough discussion). 
However,  the  time  structure  of  our  equations  (1)-(2)  are  not  due  to  backward-
looking behaviour or other frictions. On the contrary, they result from the correct 
consideration of the feed-foward effects of saving-investment imbalances.   
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(1)  ut+1  = u + r(ut - u) + a(it - pe
t+1 - r) 
where ut+1 ¹ u as long as (it - pe
t+1) ¹ r, with some degree of persistence 0 < r 
< 1. This may be called the "cap-lab" (CL) function since it relates the labour 
to the capital market.  
  The inflation rate at any point in time turns out to be governed by an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve (PC), i.e. 
(2)  pt+1 = pe
t+1 - b(ut+1 - u)  
where  b  >  0  denotes  the  responsiveness  of  nominal  prices/wages  to 
goods/labour markets deviations from steady state. It should be noted that 
this PC is consistent with flexible nominal wages and prices and a finite 
value  of  b,  in  that  it  describes  how  unemployment  reacts  to  transitory 
inflation  dynamics  as  long  as  pt+1  ¹  pe
t+1.  In  other  words,  this  can  be 
regarded as the non-vertical, out-of-equilibrium PC generated by a Lucasian 
flex-price  aggregate  supply  function  with  "surprise  inflation".  Nominal 
rigidities affecting the value of b may exist as a matter of fact, but they are 
not necessary theoretically. 
  Finally,  the  model  is  closed  by  the  determination  of  the  expected 
inflation  rate.  As  is  well  known,  investors'  expectation-formation  was  a 
matter of endless dispute in the older macroeconomic literature until the 
advent of the rational expectations hypothesis. In the context of this model, 
recourse  to  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  would  imply that  agents 
know the steady-state values of the variables, which in turn depend on the 
inflation expectation itself. This is the notorious self-referentiality inherent 
in that hypothesis (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). In order to have 
a  flexible  framework  in  which  different  expectation  mechanisms  can  be 
assessed, I consider two co-existing hypotheses.  
  The  first  is  a  close  antecedent  of  the  modern  rational  expectations 
hypothesis, namely the concept of  "normal" inflation rate. The concept of 
normal  value  of  a  variable  was  widely  used  as  point  of  reference  for 
expectations by Wicksell, Keynes and pre-Lucasian economists in  general. 
Normality was generally referred to the long-run average value observed for 
a variable, which is also expected to prevail in the future in the states of rest 
of the system. For simplicity, this information about inflation is taken as a 
pre-determined (possibly zero) value p. If the belief  that p is the normal 
inflation rate is correct, then p should result as the steady-state solution of 
inflation. If this happens, p is also the "long-run" rational expectation of the 
inflation  rate.  The  second  expectation  mechanism  is  borrowed  from  the  
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standard NNS model, namely that agents correctly anticipate next-period's 
inflation,  that  is,  Et(pe
t+1  -  pt+1)  =  0,  where  Et  indicates  the  statistical 
expectation operator  as of time t. These I would call "short-run" rational 
expectations. 
  Then,  let a share d of  agents form "short-run" rational expectations, 
while the complementary share believes in the return to normality. As a 
result, the variable pe
t+1 in equations (1) and (2)  should be replaced with 
(3)  dpt+1 + (1 - d)p 
   After  substituting  for  inflation  expectations,  the  CL-PC  equations 
form a system of two first-order difference equations with two endogenous 
variables  [ut,  pt],  one  time-varying  exogenous  variable,  it,  and  three  
exogenous constants [u, p, r]. The system can conveniently be transformed 
in  terms  of    two  endogenous  gaps  [u ˆ t  º  ut  -  u,  p ˆ t    º  pt  -  p],  and  one 
exogenous  gap  (i ˆ
t  =  it    -  i  ),  where  i  º  r  +  p.  The  latter  is  the  "non-
accelerating-inflation rate of interest" (NAIRI) or the nominal value of the 
natural  rate  at  the  normal  inflation  rate.  This  expression  is  exactly 
equivalent  to  the  difference  between  the  market  real  interest  and  the 
natural rate, but it is more convenient in the present context. Therefore we 
have the following non-homogenous system    
(4)  u ˆ t+1 = r'u ˆ t + a'i ˆ
t 
(5)  p ˆ t+1 = -b'u ˆ t+1 
where  
    a' = a
1-d
1-d(1+ ab)
,  r' = r
1-d
1-d(1+ ab)






3.3. Steady state 
  The first and most important result is that, for any constant initial 
value i ˆ
0 ¹ 0, the system admits of a solution where 















Then it is easily seen that the system achieves the steady state with 
zero endogenous gaps [u ˆ t = 0, p ˆ t = 0] if and only if i ˆ
0 = 0. The condition r' Î 
[0,  1]  also  entails  that  if  i ˆ
0  ¹  0,  unemployment  and  inflation  converge 
monotonically to, and remain locked in, the values given by (6) and (7), with  
both unemployment and inflation being inefficiently high or low, and being  
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inconsistent with their IGE values. This is in fact the analytical solution of 
the  general  implication  of  saving-investment  imbalances  discussed  above 
(see  the  quotations  from  Leijonhufvud  (1981)  and  Fitoussi  (2001)).  Note, 
however,  that  non-zero  gaps  is  a  general  property  of  non-homogenous 
systems, and we have a non-homogenous system because of the assumption 
that the nominal interest rate is exogenously given. This assumption will be 
relaxed later on. 
  The model also captures the essence of Wicksell-Keynes cumultative 
processes.  Suppose, as Wicksell did, that i ˆ
0 < 0, and the initial steady state 
is one with constant price level. Then, our result means that the price level 
would  indefinitely  rise  at  a  constant  rate  (Wicksell  (1898b,  pp.  77-78)). 
Wicksell  correctly  considered  these  price  changes  a  major  disequilibrium 
phenomenon which should be carefully understood and curbed, though they 
may occur in perfectly competitive goods and labour markets (in which case 
the NAIRU u would simply be zero). Wicksellian cumulative processes are a 
disequilibrium phenomenon in a precise sense: expectations of a return to 
normality are systematically falsified. While all markets clear at all times, 
the "error" generated by trading at the "false" interest rate in the capital 
market shows up as an expectational error about inflation. As was clear to 
Wicksell himself, and to the Swedish school in general (e.g. Boianovski and 
Trautwein (2004, 2006)),  this fact raises the problem of how expectations 
are possibly revised, and how the revision mechanism impinges upon the 
dynamic process. This problem will be reconsidered later on. 
  What is important to stress at this juncture is that this is a radically 
different interpretation of the role of  changes in the GPL with respect to the 
NNS. In the NNS model "it is only […] with sticky prices that one is able to 
introduce  the  crucial  Wicksellian  distinction  between  the  actual  and  the 
natural rate of interest, as the discrepancy between the two arises only as a 
consequence of a failure of prices to adjust sufficiently rapidly" (Woodford 
(2003, p. 238)). By contrast, Wicksell cast his theory in a competitive, flex-
price framework, and he argued that interest rates should be brought under 
policy  control  not  because  prices  do  not  move  enough,  but  because 
unfettered interest  rates may force prices to move out-of-equilibrium. On 
the  other  hand,  changes  in  the  GPL  are  a  means  to  re-equilibrate  the 
economy only if, and to the extent that, they induce the nominal interest 
rate  to  close  the  gap  with  the  natural  rate  (Wicksell  (1898a, pp.  80  ff.)).  
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Sticky prices may be introduced into the picture as a matter of realism, yet 
they are not necessary theoretically.  
  On the other hand, Wicksell did not pay sufficient attention to the 
real side of the disequilibrium cumulative process, which was unveiled by 
Keynes's theory of effective demand7. Consider now the case that  i ˆ
0 > 0. 
The  system  converges  to  a  steady-state  unemployment  rate  above  the 
NAIRU (the unemployment level given by the "right" relative price of labour 
to capital). This result may be regarded as a characterization of Keynes's 
concept  of  "involuntary  unemployment"  (with  a  caveat  to  be  discussed 
below). Given the "false" market real interest rate, not all workers ready to 
work at the IGE real wage rate will ever be employed. Since no structural 
parameter has changed that justifies a change in the real wage rate, the 
unemployment gap is entirely due to the interest-rate gap. Note also, that 
the much debated b parameter of the PC function is not so much crucial per 
se  as  it  is  in  connection  with  the  parameter  d  regulating  expectation 
formation. Insofar as the interplay between b and d fulfills the convergence 
condition r' Î [0, 1], the system does not change its qualitative properties. 
However,  for  any  given  d,  the  system  tends  towards  instability  as  b 
increases: that is, the PC function becomes steeper - a well-known argument 
by  Keynes  (1936,  ch.  19).  On  the  other  hand,  the  unemployment  gap  is 
associated  with  less-than-expected  inflation,  a  well-known  argument 
against the consistency of "involuntary unemployment" as a steady-state.  
 
3.4. System's dynamics and the role of expectations 
  First  of  all,  the  coefficients  of  the  steady-state  values  of  u ˆ   and  p ˆ  
increase  with  d  in  absolute  value,  that  is,  short-run  forward-looking 
expectations are deviation-amplifying in steady state. Moreover, the system 
will converge to the steady state only if d is bounded      








                                            
7"While  Wicksell  had  refused  to  use  his  theory  of  cumulative  processes  for  the 
explanation  of  industrial  fluctuations,  [it  was]  Lindahl  [who]  wanted  to  extend 
Wicksell's  approach  into  a  general  theory  of  business  cycle"  (Boianovsky  and 
Trautwein  (2006,  p.  8).  Lindahl  (1939)  in  fact  included  unemployment  in  his 
analysis,  foreshadowing  the  modern  distinction  between  cyclical  and  structural 
unemployment (ibid, p.11).  
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As d exceeds this threshold, unemployment and inflation will take divergent 
trajectories.  This  possibility  was  well  understood  and  feared  by  both 
Wicksell, in the event of self-sustained inflation (e.g. Wicksell (1922, XII, 
n.1)) and Keynes, in the event of bottomless deflation (1936, ch. 19). As long 
as i ˆ
0 remains positive or negative, investors anticipate the ensuing rise or 
fall in the inflation rate. As a consequence, the positive or negative gap of 
the market real interest rate relative to the natural rate is amplified, and so 
are the unemployment and inflation gaps along the adjustment path. 
  As d ® 1,  the system jumps to a steady state where u ˆ  = 0,   p ˆ  = i ˆ
0. 
On the one hand, there are no real effects, on the other, the sign of the 
relationship  between  i ˆ
0  and  p ˆ   is  inverted  (low  (high)  interest  rate 
generates excess deflation (inflation)). This replicates a well-known result in 
the modern theory of monetary policy established by McCallum (1986). As 
he stressed, this result is consistent with the Fisher equation. In fact, if one 
takes the Fisher equation as a basis for inflation expectations, then pe
t+1 = it 
- r. However, starting from the Fisher equation is not a correct rendition of 
models  of  saving-investment  imbalances,  in  which  the  Fisher  equation 
should eventually be the ending point of the adjustment of a disequilibrium 
process. Indeed, as can be seen from our treatment, McCallum's conclusion 
is  valid  only  within  the  limits  of  uniformly  held  short-run  rational 
expectations,  but  there  is  no  trajectory  leading  the  system  to  the  Fisher 
equation when the starting point is at d < 1.  
 
4. Endogenizing the nominal interest rate 
 
So far the nominal interest rate has been treated as an exogenous 
variable.  Our  next  step  will  be  to  close  the  model  with  an  adjustment 
equation of the nominal interest rate it that endogenizes the dynamics of the 
interest  rate  gap  after  an  initial  shock.  The  focus  will  be  on  endogenous 
market  mechanisms,  which  means  that  monetary  policy  is,  for  the  time 
being, left in the background. This choice can be justified for two reasons. 
The  first  is  that  there  are  various  theories  of  market  interest  rate 
determination in the context of saving-investment imbalances that should 
be  considered  in  order  to  have  a  broader  view  of  this  phenomenon.  The 
second is that the almost exclusive shift of monetary policy analysis towards 
interest-rate control that has occurred in the last few years has hidden from 
view the fundamental fact that there exist other channels of interest rate  
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determination in addition to, or in the place of, direct control of the central 
bank. 
  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  I  will  consider  three  different 
specifications inspired by the alternative theories of the interest rate put 
forward by the founders of the saving-investment imbalance approach: 1) a 
Wicksellian bank mechanism, 2) a "dynamic" Keynesian LM equation, 3)  a 
"speculative" LM equation. Let me first point out that, from an analytical 
point of view, "endogenizing" the nominal interest rate means that, whereas 
the  baseline  model  with  exogenous  interest  rate  was  a  non-homogeneous 
system,  we  may  expect  that  a  well-specified  interest-rate  equation 
transforms  the  system  into  a  homogenous  one.  This  class  of  systems 
generally admits of zero-gaps steady states, that is, complete stabilization. 
It should therefore be borne in mind that complete stabilization can be the 
outcome of any interest-rate equation that endogenizes the nominal interest 
rate properly. 
 
4.1. A Wicksellian bank mechanism.  
  The  well-known  Wicksellian  idea  is  that  the  out-of-equilibrium 
nominal  interest  rate  is  procyclical  with  the  GPL  (e.g.  (1901,  Bk.  II), 
(1898b)).  This  was  a  well-established  fact  even  before  the  inception  of 
inflation-target rules by central banks8. In Wicksell's view the reason is that 
banks raise or lower their nominal lending rate to the extent that the GPL 
increases above or decreases below what is considered its normal level. This 
process may be driven by the need of banks to keep their loans balanced 
with  real  reserves  during  the  expansion  (contraction)  of  the  demand  for 
funds and of the GPL. More simply, banks may have a real interest target 
and  index  the  nominal  rate  accordingly.  These  two  explanations  have, 
however,  different  theoretical  implications  in  the  present  context.  As 
explained in section 2, the key to interest-rate gaps essentially consists in 
information about the natural rate. Hence, the former explanation of banks' 
behaviour  hinges  on  a  limited  informational  requirement,  in  that  banks 
                                            
8 At the time when Wicksell was writing, there was already clear evidence that 
nominal  interest  rates  would  tend  to  move  together with  the GPL  (see  e.g.  the 
diagrams in 1898a) - a phenomenon later labelled the "Gibson paradox" by Keynes. 
Wicksell argued that this phenomenon would not contradict his theory, but that it 
was instead to be explained as the ongoing adjustment process of nominal interest 
rates towards a new level consistent with the steady-state level of prices.  
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need  not  know  what  the  natural  rate  is  at  each  point  in  time,  which  is 
consistent with the idea that the nominal interest rate may assume wrong 
values. The latter explanation instead requires an informational hypothesis 
about the relationship between the target real interest rate of banks and the 
natural rate, which implies the possibility that the real interest rate set by 
banks may be wrong. 
It will be convenient to work with a general formulation nesting more 
specific ones, like the following 
(8)  it+1 = f(it + g(pt+1 - pe
t+1)) + (1 - f)(rb + pt+1)   
This interest-rate equation (IR) states that, starting from a nominal interest 
rate in t, its law of motion depends on a) the share f of "adaptive" banks 
that do not have (information on) an explicit real interest target, b) their 
"indexation"  sensitivity  g  to  excess  current  inflation  with  respect  to  its 
expected level, c) the share (1 - f) of banks which have the real interest 
target rb and simply index the nominal rate to it. 
  As to inflation expectations, let us assume the same structure as the 
rest of the private sector, namely  
    pe
t+1 = dpt+1 + (1 - d)p 
  Now, defining  ˆ r º rb - r as the possible informational error of  banks 
which have a real interest target, equation (8) can easily be transformed in 
terms of the baseline model's gaps, i.e.: 
(9)  i ˆ
t+1 = fi ˆ
t + (1 - f) ˆ r  + hp ˆ t+1 
where h º 1 - f + gf(1 - d) 
  This formulation indicates that, as a result of the law of motion of the 
interest rate (8), interest-rate gaps evolve endogenously according to a) one-
period lag in proportion to the share of  banks with no real-interest target, 
fi ˆ
t,  b)  the  indexation  elasticity  to  the  inflation  gap,  h.  This  evolution  of 
interest-rate gaps may however have a drift, (1 - f) ˆ r ,  that is, the incidence 
of  banks' misinformation about the natural rate in proportion to the share 
of banks with a real-interest target. On adding this equation to the baseline 
system in gaps (4)-(5) we obtain the CL-PC-IR non-homogeneous system of 
three first-order difference equations in the three endogenous gaps [u ˆ t+1, 
p ˆ t+1, i ˆ
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Let  us  concentrate  on  conditions  for  the  system  to  achieve  a  zero-gaps 
steady state. 
1) The system admits of a zero-gaps steady state only if (1 - f)  ˆ r  = 0. 
Hence, a Wicksellian bank mechanism is potentially able to self-correct the 
interest-rate gaps that may trigger saving-investment imbalances. However, 
this  potential  stabilization  role  may  be  jeopardized  by  the  incidence  of 
banks'  misinformation  about  the  real  rate  ( ˆ r   ¹  0).  If    one  looks  at  the 
modern economics of imperfect capital markets, a "false" real interest rate is 
the typical result. This suggests that if banks take the market real interest 
rate as their target, these capital market failures undermine the system's 
intertemporal  stability.  For  this  component  to  be  neutralized,  it  should 
happen  that,  vis-à-vis  inflation,  banks  let  nominal  rates  rise  but  do  not 
engage in real-interest targeting (f = 1).  
2) In the perfect information case (f = 0,  ˆ r  = 0) the system's stability 
requires that the share d of short-run rational forecasters be bounded. This 
result is similar to the case of exogenous interest rate as discussed in section 
3. As d ® 1,  the steady state is no longer stable. More in detail, we have 
that unemployment is insensitive to interest-rate gaps (r' = 0, a' = 0) but the 
latter are nonconvergent (f - a'b'h = 1). The reason for this is simple and 
can be understood from the interest-rate gap equation (9): if all banks just 
anchor the nominal interest rate to the (true) natural rate (f = 0), the fact 
that all them also have short-run rational expectations (d = 1) implies that 
they always see the inflation rate at the level they expected to, so that the 
correction  mechanism  of  the  nominal  interest-rate  gaps  stops  working. 
Paradoxically, the system falls back in exactly the same situation as the one 
with  exogenous  interest-rate  gap:  if  a  nominal  gap  occurs,  it  becomes 
permanent,  unemployment  is  unaffected,  but  inflation  deviates  from  the 
initial normal rate permanently. 
  3) In the limited information, long-run rational-expectations case (f = 






2 2 / 1 ) 1 (
 
 Under this condition, the Wicksellian bank mechanism is self-stabilizing: as 
the nominal interest rate converges to the NAIRI, unemployment converges 
to the NAIRU and the return-to-normality hypothesis of the inflation rate is  
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fulfilled.  Hence  the  steady  state  can  be  characterized  as  a  rational-
expectations equilibrium. Notably, the nominal interest rate converges to 
the NAIRI even though this variable (and hence the natural rate) is not 
made  explicit  in  the  interest-rate  equation.    Yet  this  result  should  be 
carefully  understood:  it  hinges  on  the  generalized  belief  in  the  normal 
inflation  rate  p.  To  be  precise,  what  the  model  actually  says  is  that  any 
belief concerning the normal inflation rate consistently held by all agents is 
self-fulfilling.  
The  economic  meaning  of  the  boundedness  condition  on  g  can  be 
understood by noting that gab measures how one point of interest-rate gap 
that  triggers  a  points  of  unemployment  gap  is  self-corrected  through  the 
response  g  of  the  nominal  interest  rate  to  the  b  points  of  inflation  gap 
generated  by  the  unemployment  gap.  As  is  intuitive,  a  stabilizing 
adjustment mechanism requires that g should be smaller, the larger are a 
and b. As g increases, the system first takes an oscillatory path and then 
becomes unstable.  
 
4.2. The dynamic LM  
  The  monetary  theory  of  the  interest  rate  put  forward  by  Keynes's 
General  Theory,  and  transposed  into  the  LM  equation,  offers  a  different 
account of the way in which the nominal interest rate can be endogenized 
within  the  saving-investment  imbalances  framework:  an  account  where 
money supply and its real value play the key role. 
  It is clear that the standard specification of the LM equation, which is 
static in nature, cannot be used to address the problem of saving-investment 
imbalances,  which  is  intrinsically  dynamic  (Leijonhufvud  (1983)).  I  have 
thus devised a "dynamic LM" equation for the nominal interest rate in the 
following way. Let us start from the textbook LM function which represents 
the nominal interest rate as a function increasing in current real income 
and  decreasing  in  real  money  supply9.  If  my  and  mi  are  the  income  and 
interest-rate elasticities of money demand, then 1/mi º l  and myl are the 
                                            
9 The typical LM function is obtained by starting from a log-linear money demand 
function, 
    md
t = myyt - miit 
Equating money demand to real money supply, mt - pt, the equilibrium interest 
rate is 
    it = (my/mi)yt - (1/mi)(mt - pt).  
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elasticities  of  the  interest  rate  relative  to  real  money  supply  and  real 
income,  respectively.    This  theory  implies  that  the  interest  rate  will  be 
constant  over  time  as  long  as  real  income  and  real  money  supply  are 
constant. Assuming a log-linear relationship between output (income) and 
unemployment via production function, and starting from a given interest 
rate  in  t,  a  simple  dynamic  equation  consistent  with  this  theory  is  the 
following: 
(12)  it+1 = it - j(ut+1 - ut) - l(m ˆ t+1 - pt+1)  
where m ˆ t+1 is the growth rate of money supply.  
  We  can  now  easily  re-express  this  equation  in  terms  of  gaps  with 
respect to the NAIRI, the NAIRU and the normal inflation rate, i.e.: 
(13)  i ˆ
t+1 = i ˆ
t - j(u ˆ t+1 - u ˆ t) - l((m ˆ t+1 - p) - p ˆ t+1) 
  Adding equation (13) to the baseline model we obtain the CP-PC-LM  
system, with three endogenous gaps [u ˆ t+1,  p ˆ t+1,  i ˆ
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Hence, the conditions for the system to achieve the zero-gap steady state 
can now be summarized as follows.   
1) The system admits of a zero-gap steady state only if (m ˆ t+1 - p) = 0. 
Therefore, the message is that a plain dynamic LM function can provide a 
self-correcting  mechanism  of  interest-rate  gaps  conditional  upon  money 
supply  growing  at  the  normal  inflation  rate.  To  put  it  differently,  the 
implied self-correcting mechanism is such that the system can converge to 
the NAIRU as well as to the inflation rate dictated by the growth rate of 
money supply. 
  2) The share  d of short-run rational  forecasters should be bounded. 
This replicates the results obtained in the other versions of the model 
  3) If all agents hold the long-run expectation of the normal inflation 
rate (d = 0), the interest-rate elasticities to unemployment and real money 
supply should satisfy the boundary condition  
(15)  lj  < r/a 
The only relevant point is that the system's behaviour now crucially hinges 
on  the  relationship  between  the    parameters  of  the  LM  function.  In 
particular, stability implies an inverse relationship between the two. On the  
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other hand, the smaller is l, the smoother is the interest rate dynamics and 
the longer is the whole adjustment process. 
 
4.3. The speculative LM.  
  The last alternative determination of the nominal interest rate to be 
examined  ensues  from  one  of  the  many  criticisms  raised  against  the 
textbook LM version of Keynes’s theory of the interest rate. The thrust of 
this  criticism  is  that  one  major  element  in  that  theory,  the  "speculative 
motive" of the demand for money, has gone completely astray (Leijonhufvud 
(1981)). A truly "speculative" component of money demand should be related 
to expected movements of the interest rate relative to its future value, say ie. 
Speculators substitute bonds for money whenever they expect capital gains, 
i.e. a rise in bond prices or else a fall in the market interest rate. Therefore, 
this component should enter the usual representation of money demand  as 
a negative function of  (it - ie) (Leijonhufvud (1981, p.146)). The dynamic LM 
should therefore be rewritten as follows 
(16)  it+1 = ie - j(ut+1 - ut) - l(m ˆ t+1 - pt+1) 
This  specification  implies  that  as long  as  unemployment  and real  money 
supply are constant, speculation keeps the market interest rate aligned with 
its value expected by speculators ie. 
  For  brevity  I  do  not  report  here  the  analytical  results  of  the  new 
model.  Attention  should  be  drawn  to  the  point  that  equation  (16) 
reintroduces an exogenous constant, ie, into the model. The consequence is 
that now the zero-gaps steady state can only be attained if  ie = i. That is to 
say, if  the speculators' expected interest rate is the NAIRI, then the market 
interest rate does convergence to the NAIRI, otherwise it does not. In the 
former case, the convergence and stability conditions are slightly different 
than in the plain LM case. But this is not the main point, which is instead 
that now the determination of the nominal interest rate has, again, a crucial 
informational requirement, that is, ie.  
  The scenario under limited information, ie ¹ i  resembles the initial 
one with exogenous nominal interest rate (section 3), and, again, it seems to 
have  genuine  Keynesian  features,  in  that  if  ie  >  i,    "involuntary 
unemployment" arises because the speculative demand for money prevents 
the market interest rate from falling enough. The fundamental cause is that 
speculators do not adjust their expected rate to the lower NAIRI. On the 
other  hand,  the  market  interest  rate  stabilizes  at  a  value  lower  than  ie  
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expected by speculators, who should therefore keep on anticipating capital 
losses  in  the  bond  market  which  prevent  them  from  buying  bonds.  It  is 
tempting to see here a possible manifestation of the liquidity trap (clearly 
any further increase in the money growth rate would be useless). If this is 
the case, it seems necessary to conclude that the liquidity trap cannot be 
regarded as an extreme case in the Keynesian pathology but is indeed the 
Keynesian pathology! Are therefore Pigou and Modigliani vindicated? Not 
exactly.  A  methodological  point  made  by  Leijonhufvud  in  the  "Wicksell 
Connection" (1981) applies here, namely that the pathological states of the 
system are not due to structural parameters but to particular combinations 
of events and the way in which they are processed by markets. In fact, the 
pathology we have found is not related to anomalous liquidity preference 
(the  relevant  parameter  is  always  the  same)  but  to  an 
informational/expectational  error.  The  implications  concerning  the 
relevance of the problem are quite different.  
  On  the  one  hand,  this  scenario,  being  fraught  with  expectational 
errors,  can  hardly  be  considered  a  genuine  steady  state.  This  finding 
probably  frustrates  the  Old  Keynesians'  search  for  "involuntary 
unemployment equilibria". On the other hand, it is also challenging in that 
it points out at least one case in which, in a well-specified sense, a purely 
market-driven  interest  rate  may  put  the  system  on  the  wrong  track. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see where the system can be driven from here, 
since the corrections of the underlying errors may prove far from smooth 
and painless. 
 
4.4. A glance at monetary policy 
  Though monetary policy falls outside the scope of the present paper, it 
is worth drawing some implications from previous analyses with a view to 
further research on monetary policy issues. 
  The results yielded by the different versions of the model of saving-
investment  imbalances  elicit a  conception  of  monetary  policy as  a  visible 
hand possibly keeping the interest rate on the right track. In the framework 
of saving-investment imbalances, however, Keynesian, Monetarist as well 
as New Keynesian monetary policies share the common shortcoming that 
they do not consider (or explicitly rule out) these phenomena.  
From the Wicksellian point of view, we have seen that, although a 
spontaneous  adjustment  mechanism  may  be  at  work  through  banks'  
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interest-rate policy, it may well fall short of delivering full stabilization due 
to a) misinformation about the natural rate of banks which seek to target it, 
b) excessive weight placed upon short-run anticipation of the inflation rate.  
A  third,  more  subtle,  problem  is  that,  even  when  the  system  is  self-
adjusting, the ending rate of inflation is the rate that agents believe to be 
the  normal  rate.  Wicksell  and  his  followers  were  aware  of,  and  worried 
about,  each  of  these  wedges  driven  into  the  clockwork  by  the  banking 
system (see e.g. Boianovsky and Trautwein (2004, 2006)).   Thus Wicksell 
realized that price stability (but one might say economic stability at large, 
as  seen  above)  would  require  two  conditions:  connecting  the  nominal 
interest  rate  to  changes  in  the  GPL  in  a  stabilizing  way,  and  anchoring 
inflation  expectations  to  a  norm  against  which  erratic  GPL  movements 
should  be  gauged.  A  crucial  role  for  the  central  bank  has  emerged  as 
"manager of expectations" (Woodford (2003, pp. 15-17)). Hence Woodford is 
right when he stresses the remarkable modernity of this Wicksellian view of 
central banking and its consistency with the modern theory and practice of 
monetary  policy  rules.  However,  the  underlying  model  is  substantially 
different, and so are some key indications for monetary policy. 
Keynes,  too,  brought  monetary  policy  to  the  forefront,  with  much 
more long-lasting success than Wicksell, one should say.  However, having 
embedded saving-investment imbalances and misguided interest rates in a 
different framework, Keynes set the stage for the resurgence of a view of 
monetary policy, centered upon the quantity control of liquidity supply, that 
for about fifty years substantially departed from Wicksell's road.  The most 
important lessons to be learned are two. The first is that a Keynesian LM 
interest-rate equation does not seem, per se, sufficient to explain a steady 
state with involuntary unemployment. If the real balance effect operates, 
the  economy  seems  to  be  endowed  with  a  reliable  self-stabilizing 
mechanism. The second is that the most important role for monetary policy 
is  more  Friedmanite  than  Keynesian.  Apart  from    accelerating  and 
smoothing the adjustment process, little scope is left for money supply. Far 
more important is the point that the steady-state inflation, the rate in which 
agents have reason to believe in the long run, is the one dictated by the 
growth rate of money. Overall, these implications amount to the Monetarist 
interpretation of the Old Synthesis (see also Leijonhufvud (1981)). 
The real threat to this optimistic view "only" comes from the market's 
misperception  of  the  long-run  value  of  the  interest  rate.  This  threat  
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parallels the one we have seen in the case of Wicksellian banks. The result 
is similar, in that the system is driven out of equilibrium, while monetary 
policy becomes impotent. 
  This  last  conclusion  may  sound  like  an  additional  argument  in 
support of the general endorsement of interest-rate control strategies by all 
main central banks in the world - in the Neo-Wicksellian spirit highlighted 
by  Woodford.  Indeed,  it  is  almost  trivial  to  observe  that  a  Wicksellian 
interest-rate mechanism like (8) is substantially similar to a rule of inflation 
targeting  with  interest-rate  smoothing,  where  pe
t+1  is  replaced  with  the 
central banks' target (Svensson (1997)). Thus, one may interpret (8) as the 
reduced form of a set of inter-bank relationships whereby the central bank 
drives the interest rate on loans, with the anchor of expected inflation being 
explicitly set by the central bank.  
As to the Wicksellian pedigree of the Taylor rule, it is indeed easy to 
see that it consists of the Wicksellian bank mechanism plus the sensitivity 
of the interest rate to output gaps. However, since the latter are correlated 
with inflation gaps, an interest-rate equation like (8) can also be interpreted 
as the reduced form of a Taylor rule. An immediate implication is that the 
so-called "Taylor principle" – that is, the requirement that the inflation-gap 
parameter be greater than 1 (Woodford (2001)) – is neither necessary nor 
sufficient.  For  particular  combinations  of  very  low  persistence  (r)  and/or 
very high elasticity (a) of output gaps with respect to interest-rate gaps, g > 
1  might  even  turn  out  to  be  destabilizing.  On  the  other  hand,  once  the 
relevant stability condition has been verified, g < 1 may well be sufficient. 
  Finally, specific consideration should be made of the prescription that 
the Taylor rule should be pegged to the natural rate of interest (Woodford 
(2003, ch. 4)). This prescription stands in sharp contrast with our previous 
findings, which warn that managing the interest rate with a natural-rate 
target may be dangerous. Wicksell himself was well aware that the crucial 
challenge for monetary (and banking) policy lies in the natural interest rate 
being  subject  to  unobservable  shocks  and  fluctuations  (1898a,  pp.  82  ff.). 
Keynes (1937a, b) was even more radical, casting doubts on the existence 
itself of a single, general-equilibrium real interest rate. In a recent study 
published by the ECB, one reads that 
from the empirical point of view, the "natural" real interest rate is unobservable. 
The  estimation  of  the  natural  real  interest  rate  is  not  straightforward  and  is  
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associated with a very high degree of uncertainty (Garnier and Wihelmsen (2005), 
p.6). 
  If the central bank has complete and immediate information about 
the NAIRI, it can and should immediately adjust the nominal interest rate 
to offset any change in the NAIRI as it arises. If the central bank does not 
have this information, and if it happens to peg the nominal interest rate to 
the  wrong  NAIRI,  then  the  Taylor  rule  would  drive  the  system  out  of 
equilibrium,  like  the  Wicksellian  misinformed  banks  or  the  Keynesian 
speculators that the central bank is supposed to keep on the right track. 
Hence,  unless  we  can  be  highly  confident  that  central  banks  are  better 
(perfectly)  informed  than  the  market  about  the  natural  rate  of  interest, 
"adaptive" rules, using step-by-step adjustments of the interest rate vis-à-
vis observable conditions in the economy are preferable in that they produce 




   
  Let me summarize the main findings of this exploration of the old and 
new macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets. The  idea of the founders 
of  this  approach  to  macroeconomics,  Wicksell  and  Keynes  above  all,  was 
that some form of malfunctioning of the capital market and the consequent 
saving-investment imbalances were the keys to both the determination of 
the current level of output and prices and of their fluctuations over time. 
The modern foundations of imperfect capital markets have greatly improved 
the microeconomic level of analysis, but saving-investment imbalances still 
lack appropriate development at the macro-level. The aim of this paper has 
been to signal the problem and exemplify a model that can deal with saving-
investment imbalances. 
  The  model  proposed  represents  a  competitive,  flex-price  economy 
populated by forward-looking, optimizing households and firms that freely 
choose their levels of savings and investments in a capital market where the 
market  real  interest  rate  may  differ  from  the  natural  rate  (interest-rate 
gap). The allocation scheme that has been chosen is that of trading at false 
                                            
10This line of research is actively pursued, for instance, by Orphanides and co-
authors (Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2006)).  
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price, that can be detected in Wicksell's approach as well as in some modern 
contributions.  In  this  scheme,  when  saving  differs  from  investment  the 
banking sector fills the gap by hoarding or dishoarding reserves.  
  The  first  main  conclusion  is  that  as  long  as  the  interest-rate  gap 
persists,  neither  unemployment  nor  the  GPL  can  remain  on  their  IGE 
paths. This outcome reflects persistent intertemporal disequilibrium, and it 
occurs even though no other frictions or rigidities are present in economy.  
This  conclusion  stands  in  sharp  contrast  with  current  mainstream 
macroeconomics,  where  there  are  no  capital  market  imperfections,  the 
economy  is  always  on  its  IGE  path,  fluctuations  are  only  exogenously 
driven,  and  all  relevant  problems  (excess  movements  in  quantities)  may 
only arise due to price stickiness. Nominal wage-price stickiness is not the 
only problem, wage-price flexibility is not the only solution. 
  A second set of conclusions can be drawn from analyses of different 
hypotheses  that  make  the  nominal  interest  rate  endogenous.  The 
Wicksellian  hypothesis  that  banks  index  their  nominal  rate  with  excess 
inflation  (with  respect  to  the  "normal"  rate)  has  the  potential  role  to 
stabilize the system, that is, to achieve a zero-gap steady state along the 
IGE path. A major finding in this respect is that this potential role is under 
threat if a) banks have limited or wrong information about the natural rate, 
and b) they engage in the natural-rate targeting. Since a typical result of 
the modern literature on capital market failures is that the real interest 
rate is wrong, the recommendation is that banks let their nominal rates rise 
with prices but do not aim at the real-rate target. 
  Analysis  of  a  Keynesian  capital  market  based  on  the  monetary 
determination of the interest rate by way of a "dynamic" LM function leads 
to  similarly  mixed  conclusions.  A  dynamic  LM  function  represents  a 
stabilizing mechanism for the nominal interest rate provided that exogenous 
money supply grows at the same rate as the "normal" inflation rate, which 
in fact is realized in the steady state. Under these conditions, the economic 
system  is  probably  more  robust  than  the  Old  Keynesians  (and  Keynes?) 
believe(d), and the mere existence of the interest elasticity of money demand 
is  not  an  impediment.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  introduce  a  wrong 
"speculative component" – that is, an expected interest rate that is too high 
with  respect  to  the  equilibrium  one  –  the  adjustment  mechanism  breaks 
down and the economy is trapped in a high unemployment state (in which, 
however, both the expected interest rate and inflation rate are not realized).  
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  Overall,  we  have  seen  that  business  cycles  triggered  by  saving-
investment  imbalances  are  benign  as  long  as  the  system  embodies  an 
endogenous mechanism that drives the nominal interest rate to close the 
gaps with the NAIRI. This is the main message as far as monetary policy is 
concerned. The current approach based on interest-rate rules is consistent 
with  this  perspective.  However,  the  underlying  macro-model  has  to  be 
different from those currently employed in order to capture the features of 
intertemporal disequilibrium cycles. To mention just one point, the warning 
against  natural-rate  targeting,  and  the  plea  for  simple  adaptive  rules, 
extends from private banks to the central bank.   
  If, against this background, we look at the evidence showing that the 
natural interest rate is a volatile variable difficult to measure and transmit 
to capital markets, and that saving-investment imbalances are detectable 
behind all major boom-bust episodes, we can conclude that reassessment of 
the  macroeconomics  of  imperfect  capital  markets  may  be  timely.  Further 
elaborations of saving-investment analysis that can be indicated include the 
following: 
·  Keynes  (1937),  Lindahl  (1939),  New  Keynesians  à  la  Greenwald  and 
Stiglitz (1993), and Woodford on passing  (2003, ch. 5), would add that 
the deviations of the market real interest rate from the natural rate do 
not  leave  the  capital  stock  unaffected  (which  is  a  straightforward 
implication of the fact that saving-investment imbalances impinge upon 
aggregate demand, employment and output). If the capital stock changes 
over  the  cycle,  then  the  real  return  to  capital  also  changes.  Thus,  as 
Woodford recognizes, we (or the agents in the economy) out of the steady 
state face three interest rates: the market real interest, the actual real 
return to  capital, and the natural interest rate. Yet all this blurs the 
notion  of  a  given  natural  rate  of  interest  independent  of  the  cycle  to 
which the economy should return, and we are led back to the question of 
the normative anchorage of the belief in a particular natural rate. 
·  A somewhat more radical perspective would add behavioural finance as a 
repertoire  of  causes  for  the  mispricing  of  firms'  investments  and 
consequent misbeliefs in the natural interest rate. 
·  Neo-Hicksians  (e.g.  Amendola  and  Gaffard  (1998))  stress  that 
"technological shocks" (possibly underlying the volatility of the NAIRI) 
are  as  such  non  existent  (e.g.  they  remain  ideas  in  the  mind  of 
entrepreneurs)  until  they  are  "validated"  by  financial  means;  in  this  
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perspective,  changes  in  the  NAIRI  are  not  independent  of  monetary 
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